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The Continuing Burden of Short-Sighted Nuclear Waste Policy
Dominion Res., Inc. v. United States, 641 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
I. INTRODUCTION
Little more than a decade after the bombing of Hiroshima, the first
full-scale commercial nuclear power plant opened in Sellafield, United
Kingdom on October 17, 1956.' Nuclear engineers proved that the advent
of nuclear power heralded not only the possibility of the total destruction
of mankind through nuclear war, but also the possibility of producing
electricity through a safe, economical, and plentiful power source.
In the past fifty-six years, governmental acceptance and advocacy
of nuclear power has varied widely across the globe. France remains the
world's leading implementer of nuclear power.2 As a result of the 1973
OPEC oil embargo and France's relative lack of fossil fuels, then-Prime
Minister Pierre Messmer instituted an ambitious plan to further French
energy independence through nuclear plant construction. 3 The Messmer
' BBC On This Day: Queen Switches on Nuclear Power, BRITISH BROADCASTING
COMPANY,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/october/1 7/newsid_3147000/3147145.st
m (last visited Nov. 20, 2011).
2 World Nuclear Power Reactors & Uranium Requirements, WORLD NUCLEAR
ASSOCIATION (Oct. 21, 2011) http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/reactors.html.
3 Electricite de France, FUNDING UNIVERSE, http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-
histories/Electriciteacute;-de-France-Company-History.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2012).
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plan launched thirteen new nuclear power plants within two years and
helped France produce three-quarters of its electricity through nuclear
power by 1990.4 France has maintained that percentage into the present.5
Additionally, France maintained a policy of recycling its spent
nuclear fuel ("SNF"), a highly radioactive byproduct that comes from
nuclear power generation. 6 SNF recycling allows for more energy to be
extracted from the initial uranium fuel and drastically decreases the
amount of waste produced by nuclear power generation.7 Approximately
one-fifth of French nuclear power generation comes from recycled nuclear
waste.8
American nuclear history stands in stark contrast to the record of
the French Republic. During the implementation of the Messmer plan, the
French nuclear industry remained relatively free from costly nuclear
accidents. 9 American nuclear plants have not been so fortunate. Much
As a response to the United States' support of Israel during the Yom Kippur war of 1973,
the Arab dominated Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries drastically curtailed
oil exports to the United States and its allies, quadrupling the price of oil. OPEC Oil
Embargo, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, http://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-
1976/OPEC (last visited Apr. 6, 2012).
4id.




9 Electricite de France, FUNDING UNIVERSE, http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-
histories/Electriciteacute;-de-France-Company-History.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2012).
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like the SNF that comes from its nuclear power plants, American nuclear
policy is highly reactive. Often taking its cue from volatile public reaction
to nuclear disasters, American nuclear policy lurches from one decision to
the next, oblivious to the sum of its effects. Construction began on each of
the currently operating American nuclear power plants before the nuclear
meltdown on Three Mile Island'o in 1979." Since 1979, construction has
begun on only two additional nuclear plants, and both are still under
construction.12 More pressing than the future construction of nuclear
power plants, the government has been unable to find a long-term storage
solution for American SNF. Swayed by the nuclear meltdowns at Three
Mile Island and Chernobyl and the continuing apprehension of
transporting or storing nuclear waste in the vicinity of their constituents,
government policymakers have developed an unsustainable and costly
solution to the storage of American SNF.
to On March 28, 1979, a coolant failure in Mile Island Unit 2, a nuclear power plant near
Middleton, Pennsylvania, led to a meltdown of the Unit's reactor. NRC: Backgrounder
on the Three Mile Island Accident, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION,
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/3mile-isle.html (last visited
Mar. 3, 2012). Though the meltdown released radiation into the surrounding area, later
studies showed that the release had a negligible effect on the local population. Id.
" Matthew L. Wald, Nuclear 'Renaissance'Is Short on Largess, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7,
2010, 5:53 PM), http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/12/07/nuclear-renaissance-is-short-
on-largess/.
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II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In 2001, Dominion Nuclear Connecticut ("Dominion"), a utility
company, bought three nuclear power plants at the Millstone Power
Stationl 3 from Northeast Utilities.14 As part of the agreement, Northeast
Utilities assigned three Standard Contracts15 to Dominion, thereby
transferring title of Northeast Utilities' SNF and "all rights of the
Sellers.. .under [the Department of Energy]'s Standard Contracts
(including all rights to any claims of Sellers related to [the Department]'s
defaults thereunder)." 6 Dominion then sued the federal government for
costs stemming from the storage of its SNF, including $12.1 million in
costs incurred by Northeast Utilities before Dominion purchased
Millstone.' 7 The Court of Federal Claims awarded Dominion $10.9
million in pre-acquisition damages.' 8
1 The Millstone Power Station is located near New London, Connecticut. Dominion
Res., Inc. v. United States, 641 F.3d 1359, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
14 id.
" 10 C.F.R. § 961.11 (2012).
1 Dominion, 641 F.3d at 1361.
7 Id. (citing Dominion Res., Inc. v. United States, 84 Fed. Cl. 259, 263, 285 (Fed. Cl.
2008)).
8 Id. (citing Dominion Res., Inc. v. United States, 84 Fed. Cl. 259, 263 (Fed. Cl. 2008)).
The Court of Federal Claims served as the trial court.
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The government appealed on two grounds.19 First, it claimed that
the Assignment of Claims Act, ("Claims Act")20 prohibited Northeast
Utilities from transferring its claim for SNF storage costs to Dominion.2'
Second, the government claimed that the trial court incorrectly denied the
government's request for discovery into Dominion's deferral of the one-
time fee payment, which stemmed from the government's failure to
execute the Standard Contract.22 The Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit affirmed both issues, holding that the Assignment of Claims Act
does not bar a party to a Standard Contract from transferring a damages
claim for breach of contract along with the transfer of the contract itself;
additionally, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that no
discovery may be made into the transferee's economic benefit from the
deferral of the one-time fee owed to the government.23
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Nuclear power uses the heat from an atomic reaction in uranium
fuel rods to boil water into steam, which then turns the turbines of
24
electricity generators. Uranium fuel rods eventually decay, producing a
19 Dominion Res., Inc. v. United States, 641 F.3d 1359, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
20 Pub.L. No. 97-258, § 1, 96 Stat. 976 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3727 (2006)).
21 Dominion, 641 F.3d at 1361.
22 Id. at 1360.
23 id.
24 Scott R. Helton, The Legal Problems of Spent Nuclear Fuel Disposal, 23 ENERGY L.J.
179, 180 (2002).
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radioactive byproduct, SNF.25 SNF can be recycled.26 The reprocessing
procedure, currently employed by nations such as the United Kingdom
and Japan, separates the SNF into 95% reusable uranium, 1% plutonium,
and 4% highly radioactive waste product.27 However, in 1977, the Carter
administration saw SNF recycling as a nuclear weapons proliferation risk
because the recycling process produces weapons grade plutonium.28 In an
unsuccessful effort to curtail nuclear weapons proliferation by example,
the United States ended its SNF reprocessing, thus increasing the amount
of nuclear waste produced by nuclear power.
A. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act
The Federal Court of Appeal's decision in Dominion Resources v.
United States stems from the Federal Government's twenty-eight year old
promise to safely store the nation's SNF. Unfortunately, the Federal
Government made the promise without the ability to deliver. After
25 Id at 180.
26 d at 181.
27 Id. at n.23 (citing Mark Holt, Civilian Nuclear Spent Fuel Temporary Storage Options,
Congressional Report for Congress, 96-212, at P 50 (Mar. 27, 1998), available at
http://www.cnie.org/nle/waste-20.html.
28 Tanya Mortensen, An Unattainable Wedge: Four Limiting Effects on the Expansion of
Nuclear Power, 5 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL'Y J. 60, 74 (2010) (citing Richard B.
Stewart, Nuclear Waste Law and Policy: Fixing a Bankrupt System, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL.
L.J. 784, 789 (2008)).
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29banning SNF recycling in 1978, the United States still needed a place to
store its SNF. Two instances of public fear compelled political action.
First, in the wake of the Three Mile Island meltdown that forced 140,000
people to leave their homes in central Pennsylvania in fear of nuclear
radiation, legislators felt political pressure to ship SNF out of their states
and into a permanent repository. 30 In 1983, President Reagan signed the
Nuclear Waste Policy Act ("NWPA") into law.3' The NWPA required the
U.S. Department of Energy ("The Department") to refuse to issue or
renew an operation license with any plant that did not enter into a
Standard Contract for the Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel ("Standard
Contract") with the Department. 32 The Standard Contract stated that the
government would begin collecting SNF no later than January 31, 1998.33
The NWPA placed the cost of transporting SNF and building the
repository directly on energy producers.34 Energy producers would pay
the government for the cost of transporting and storing their SNF.35
Energy producers' payment would go into the government run Nuclear
Waste Fund.36 The NWPA also authorized the Secretary of Energy to
29 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-242 [H.R. 8638], 92 Stat. 120.
Section 105.
30 Mortensen, supra note 288, at 74.
3 Tom Kenny, Where to Put It All? Opening the Judicial Road for A Long-Term Solution
to the Nation's Nuclear Waste Problem, 86 NOTRE DAME L. Rev. 1319, 1322 (2011).
32 Kenny, supra note 31, at 1323 (citing § 10222(b)(1)(A)).
3 Helton, supra note 24, at 184 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 10222(a)(5)(B) (2006)).
34 Kenny, supra note 311, at 1323 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 10131 (b)(1) (2006)).
3s Helton, supra note 244, at 184 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 10222 (2006)).
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nominate five sites at which to build the single nuclear depository, from
which the President would choose the final location.37
However, legislative action after the passage of the NWPA
presaged the current SNF impasse. Erstwhile, pro-nuclear legislators went
to great lengths to keep their states and districts
from becoming permanent recipients of the nation's SNF. Under the apt
headline "Nuclear Waste: Problem No One Wants and It Won't Go
Away", The Washington Post reported that Representative Trent Lott,
"who has never been known as an enemy of nuclear power plants,
nonetheless has been at considerable pains to see that Mississippi is
outlawed as the home of an interim waste depository." 39
Congressional foot-dragging on the selection of the permanent
repository continued until another nuclear incident shook the nation's
nerves. Unlike the Three Mile Island incident, which cost no lives and
incurred limited physical damage, the complete meltdown in Chernobyl
killed thirty Soviet citizens,40 caused acute radiation syndrome in 134
others,4 1 and led to the permanent resettlement of 220,000 people.42 The
Kenny, supra note 31, at 1324 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 10132(b)(1) (2006), 42 U.S.C. §
10132(c)(1) (2006)).
38 Id. at 1324 (citing Mary McGrory, Op-Ed., Nuclear Waste: Problem No One Wants,
andIt Won't Go Away, WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 1982, at A3).
" Id. at n.45
40 Chernobyl Accident 1986, WORLD NUCLEAR ASSOCIATION, (Sept. 2011)
http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/chemobyl/inf07.html.
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Chernobyl incident compelled Congress to amend the NWPA in 1987.43
The amended NWPA authorized the Secretary of Energy to only consider
the feasibility of Yucca Mountain in Nevada as a permanent depository."
By targeting Yucca Mountain in Nevada as the only possible depository,
the hasty action of the amended NWPA galvanized public opinion in the
Silver State and spurred its Congressional representatives to use their
legislative resources to delay both funding and construction of the Yucca
Mountain repository. In 2011, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-
NV) declared, after nearly two decades of obstruction, "Yucca Mountain
is dead. And I think it's time for opponents to move on."4 5
B. Redefining the NWPA
By the early 1990's, the Department of Energy saw it had a
problem-the January 31, 1998 deadline to begin collecting SNF
approached. All utilities had to sign Standard Contracts in order to renew
their operating licenses. The 1987 amendment prevented the Secretary of
Energy from exploring alternatives to Yucca Mountain. Legislators
obstructed the bills that would authorize funds to build the repository in
43 Kenny, supra note 311, at 1325.
"Id. at 1325 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 10133(a) (2006) ("The Secretary shall carry out, in
accordance with the provisions of this section, appropriate site characterization activities
at the Yucca Mountain site.")).
45 Kenny, supra note 311, at 1348 (quoting Karoun Demirjian, Despite House GOP
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Nevada. With no repository, no alternative site, and obligations foisted
upon it by the words in NWPA, the Department attempted the most cost
effective solution: reinterpreting the words in the statute. In February
1994, Secretary of Energy Hazel O'Leary stated that the Department had
no "clear legal obligation under the [NWPA] to accept [SNF] absent an
operational repository."46 One year later, the Secretary's comments
became part of the Department of Energy's Final Interpretation of
Nuclear Waste Acceptance Issues.47 In its interpretation of the regulation,
the Department disavowed statutory or contractual obligations to collect
SNF by January 31, 1998.48 Without a repository, the Department claimed
it had no obligation to provide interim storage in a facility that was not
licensed or authorized under the NWPA.49
C. The Litigation
Eager to have a court judgment, utilities began their litigation
against the Department of Energy even before the Department issued its
final interpretation. In 1994, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
dismissed a suit brought by utilities against the Department for lack of a
46 Indiana Michigan Power Co. v. U.S. Dept. of Energy, 88 F.3d 1272, 1274 (D.C. Cir.
1996).
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final agency action.50 Utilities found mixed results when they brought suit
again in 1996."' In a positive development for the utilities, the D.C. Court
of Appeals found that the Department had an obligation to take the SNF
by January 31, 1998 regardless of the repository's status. 52 However, the
Appellate Court handed down a less than positive holding in that the
utilities could not receive any damages since the deadline had not yet
passed and the Department had not yet breached.53
With a court order saying they were in the right, but without any
immediate remedy, the utilities made their case for a writ of mandamus in
Northern States Power Co. v United States Department ofEnergy
("Northern 1"). 54 The writ would abrogate the Standard Contract's dispute
resolution clause and force the Department to begin to collect the utilities'
SNF.s Since the utilities in Northern I had complied with their duty to
pay the one-time fee into the Nuclear Waste Fund for SNF disposal, the
D.C. Court of Appeals found that the utilities were entitled to relief.56
50 Annemarie Wall, Going Nowhere in the Nuke of Time: Breach of the Yucca Contract,
Nuclear Waste Policy Act Fallout and Shelter in Private Interim Storage, 12 ALB. L.
ENvTL. OUTLOOK J. 138, 166-67 (2007) (citing N. States Power Co. v. Dep't of Energy,
No. 94-1457, 94-1458, 94-1574, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 22422, at *1 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(granting DOE's motion to dismiss)).
s' Helton, supra note 244, at 188 (citing Indiana Michigan, 88 F.3d at 1272).
52 Id. (citing Indiana Michigan Power Co. v. U.S. Dept. of Energy, 88 F.3d 1272, 1277
(D.C. Cir. 1996)).
" Id. at 189.
54 Wall, supra note 50 at 168-69 (citing N. States Power Co. v. U.S. Dept. of Energy, 128
F.3d 754 (D.C. Cir. 1997)).
5s Helton, supra note 244, at 189-90.
" Id. at 189.
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Moreover, the D.C. Court of Appeals found that the government could not
escape liability even though it styled its failure to build a repository as
"unavoidable." 7 However, because of the possibility of an alternative
remedy-the deadline had not yet passed-the D.C. Court of Appeals
declined to issue its writ of mandamus in full."
Once the January 31, 1998 deadline passed, the D.C. Court of
Appeals changed its tune. Northern States again filed suit. 59 The utility
claimed that the alternative remedy no longer existed as of February 1,
1998 because the Department was then in breach of its contract with the
utilities. 0 The D.C. Court of Appeals agreed.61 In a similar case heard at
the same time, Yankee Atomic Electric Company successfully sued to
reclaim a one-time fee paid to the Department of Energy. Yankee had
already paid the one-time fee because its electricity production ceased
before the NWPA went into effect.63 Later, in the 2000 cases of Northern
States Power. Co v. United States (Northern Il) and Maine Yankee Atomic
Power Co. v. United States, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
7 Id. at 190.
58 id.
5 Wall, supra note 50, at 171.
60 id.
61 id
62 Helton, supra note 264, at 193.
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ruled that utilities need not resort to the remedies in the Standard Contract
and could instead seek a judicial remedy. 64
The litigation green light from the Northern II decision ensured
that the taxpayer would pay for the government's failure to fulfill its
promise in the NWPA. In 2007, the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste
Management estimated that the government would owe utilities seven
billion dollars for the delay in collecting SNF.65 The sum owed would
increase by half a billion dollars each year that passed without a
permanent repository in place. 66
D. Assignment ofRights
The NWPA states, "[t]he rights and duties of a party to a contract
entered into under this section may be assignable with transfer of title to
the spent nuclear fuel or high-level radioactive waste involved."67
Congress foresaw that nuclear power plants and SNF might change hands
over time. It wanted to ensure its contracts with nuclear power plants
were honored.
MId. at 197 (citing Me. Yankee Atomic Power Co. v. United States, 225 F.3d 1336, 1343
(Fed. Cir. 2000); N. States Power Co v. United States, 224 F.3d 1362, 1367 (Fed. Cir.
2000)).
65 Kenny, supra note 311, at 1331 (citing Matthew L. Wald, U.S. to Owe Billions for
Delays in Nuclear Dump, Official Says, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2007, at C4).
6 Id.
67 42 U.S.C. § 10222(b)(3) (2006).
163
THE CONTINUING BURDEN OF SHORT-SIGHTED NUCLEAR WASTE POLICY
However, Congress also anticipated bad actors. Before Congress
passed the NWPA, it had enacted anti-assignment statutes to "prevent
persons of influence from buying up claims against the United States,
which might then be improperly urged upon officers of the
Government."68 Anti-assignment statutes include the Claims Act, which
Congress first enacted at the beginning of the Mexican-American War.69
In the Claims Act, Congress attempted to simplify recovery procedures by
allowing the government "to deal exclusively with the original claimant
instead of several parties."7 o The court in Tuftco v. United States
identified the Claims Act as pertaining to claims for work already done.7'
The court in Tuftco also identified the "Contract Act," 41 U.S.C. § 15,
which involves executory contracts and focuses on continuing
72obligations. However, the Tuftco court concluded, "[i]n general terms,
however, the concerns of the two statutes and the legal concepts involved
in their applicability are the same."73
68 Tufico Corp. v. United.States, 614 F.2d 740, 744 (Ct. Cl. 1980) (citing Spofford v.
Kirk, 97 U.S. 484,490 (1878)).
69 Dominion Res., Inc. v. United States, 641 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 201 1)(Gajarsa, J.,
dissenting) (citing An Act in Relation to the Payment of Claims, ch. 66, 9 Stat. 41
(1846)).
70 Tuftco, 614 F.2d at 744 (citing Patterson v. United States, 354 F.2d 327, 173 Ct.Cl. 819
(Cl. Ct. 1965)).
7 Id. at n.4.
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E. One-Time Fee
The Department of Energy laid out three payment plans for SNF
transportation and storage in article VIII.B.2 of the Standard Contract.74
Only one option was relevant for the case at hand. Option 2 of the
payment plan allowed utilities to opt for a one-time payment into the
Nuclear Waste Fund prior to delivery.75 Should utilities defer payment of
the one-time fee until the government collected the SNF, the government
would charge utilities interest.76 Utilities found the interest quite
expensive after they had to wait for the construction of the permanent SNF
depository. In Yankee Atomic Electric v. United States, Maine Electric
owed $159 million in 2008 on an original bill of approximately $50
million.77 In Yankee Atomic, the D.C. Court of Appeals found, in that
partial breach of contract case, the government's performance obligations
survived a partial breach of contract, and that as the non-breaching party,
Maine Electric owed no obligation to the government until the government
performed.78
74 Dominion, 641 F.3d at 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
75 Yankee Atomic Elec. Co. v. United States, 536 F.3d 1268, 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
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IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Dominion Resources v. United States, the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit had to resolve two issues.79 First, it would determine
whether the similar language in the NWPA and language of the Standard
Contract prevailed over the language of the Claims Act.80 Second, the
court would decide whether the government could use discovery to
investigate whether Dominion experienced an economic benefit from not
having to pay the one-time fee, which was not yet due because the
government's breached of the Standard Contract and could not yet collect'
the SNF from the utility.81
A. Which Law Trumps
The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals stated the first issue in the
instant case was whether the language that "permits assignment of 'the
rights and duties of a party to a contract"' also allowed a party to "transfer
the damages claim for breach along with the transfer of the contract." 82
79 Dominion Res., Inc. v. United States, 641 F.3d 1359, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
80 ida
81 Id
8 2 1Id. at 1362.
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The court first examined the statutory language.83 The court found that
the language in both the NWPA and the Standard Contract stated that a
party may assign its rights and duties when it transfers title of its SNF.8
The court also noted that the Department made the decision to incorporate
the language of the NWPA into its Standard Contract.
Next, the court noted that the government sought to modify its own
plain language by either permitting assignment of only the continuing
rights and duties of the contract, or by stating that only a contract may be
assigned-not the rights and duties of a party.86 The court saw that the
government's attempt to restyle its own plain language would prevent
Dominion from recovering damages inflicted on Northeast Utilities. 7 The
court rejected the government's approach as contrary to the broad and
plain language of the NWPA and the Standard Contract.88 The broad and
plain language of the NWPA and the Standard Contract allowed
Northwest Utilities to transfer claims of breach to Dominion, even though
those claims of breach occurred before the transfer.89
83 id.
4 Id. (citing NWPA 42 U.S.C. § 10222(b)(3) (2006) and Standard Contract 10 C.F.R.
§961.11, Art. XIV (2011)).
85 Dominion Res., Inc. v. United States, 641 F.3d 1359, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing 10
C.F.R. § 961.11, Art. XIV (2011)).
6 1d. at 1363.
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Additionally, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit rejected
the government's assertion that the policy considerations of the Claims
Act trumped the plain language of the NWPA and the Standard Contract. 90
Congress designed the Claims Act to allow the government to only deal
with the original contractor in hopes of streamlining evidence
accumulation and preventing multiple payments of claims. 91 The court
found the plain language of the NWPA and the Standard Contract trumped
the policy considerations of the Claims Act.92 The court went even
further, stating that the current scenario did not implicate the policy
considerations of the Claims Act.93 The court presented several reasons.
First, no issue existed as to whether the parties intended to transfer the
right to sue for interim storage of the SNF.94 Second, Dominion sued for
all storage fees, mitigating the risk of multiple payments of claims.95
Third, the burden rested on the plaintiff to prove damages.96 Fourth, the
government did not assert that it needed discovery to disprove the
existence of the claim and therefore had no need to streamline evidence
accumulation.97
90 d





96 Id. at 1363-64.
9 Dominion Res., Inc. v. United States, 641 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
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B. Bills Still Owed
After the Court found the plain and broad language of the NWPA
and the Standard Contract trumped the policy considerations of the Claims
Act, it then turned to the issue of whether the possibility of Dominion's
economic benefit from the government's breach warranted discovery.
Northeast Utilities had chosen to pay a one-time fee for SNF collection,
which would come due prior to the collection.99 Before the fee came due,
Northeast Utilities transferred that duty to Dominion.100 The government
posited that, because of the government's breach, Dominion benefited
from not having to pay the one-time fee, which, by 2010, totaled
$82,100,000.101 In an attempt to offset the damages, the government sued
for discovery rights as to whether Dominion received a windfall from not
yet having to pay the one-time fee.102
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit compared the
government's argument in the instant case with the argument it made in




"o1 Id. at 1364.
102 id.
103 Dominion Res., Inc. v. United States, 641 F.3d 1359, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing
Yankee Atomic Elec. Co. v. United States, 536 F.3d 1268, 1280 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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Atomic, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found the
government's partial breach of contract did not relieve the injured utility
of its obligation to pay the storage fee with interest.' 04 Therefore, the
government could not receive an offset for damages awarded.'05
Here, Dominion did not receive a windfall, because it had to bear
the cost of continued storage of spent nuclear fuel.'06 Dominion would
have to pay the one-time fee once the government fulfills its contractual
obligation. 07 The one-time fee was not waived and would still need to be
accounted for once the government fulfills its obligation and collects the
SNF belonging to Dominion. 08
C. Dissenting Opinion
Judge Arthur Gajarsa filed an opinion concurring-in-part and
dissenting-in-part.109 After reviewing the history of the Claims Act dating
back to the Mexican-American war, Judge Gajarsa highlighted the
language of the current Claims Act which states, with his emphasis, "'[a]n
assignment may be made only after a claim is allowed, the amount of
1" Id. (citing Yankee Atomic, 536 F.3d at 1280.
"o Yankee Atomic, 536 F.3d at 1280.
.o. Dominion, 641 F.3d at 1365.
I07 id.
'0 Dominion Res., Inc. v. United States, 641 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Gajarsa,
J., dissenting).
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the claim is decided, and a warrant for payment of the claim has
been issued. ,,,o (alteration in original). Judge Gajarsa
interpreted the statute to read that assignments can "only be made
after allowance and ascertainment remains.""' Furthermore, he
emphasized the Supreme Court generally precludes voluntary
assignments. 12
By applying the law to the facts of the case, Judge Gajarsa
determined Northeast Utilities' assignment to Dominion violated the
Claims Act.' 13 He suggested that the assignment of the Standard Contract
was neither "ascertained nor allowed" when Northeast Utilities assigned it
in 2001.114 Judge Gajarsa found Northeast's assignment to Dominion
violated the main purpose of the Claims Act: to prevent the government
from dealing with multiple parties."' 5 Because Congress normally uses
explicit language to waive a right to the Claims Act, Judge Gajarsa refused
to adopt the majority's broad interpretation of the NWPA.116 Judge
Gajarsa concluded the "rights and duties" of the NWPA and the Standard
0 Id. at 1366 (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3727(b) (2006) (alteration in original)).
"' Id.
112 Id. at 1367 (e.g., United States v. Dow, 357 U.S. 17, 20 (1958); United States v.
Shannon, 342 U.S. 288, 292 (1952); Spofford v. Kirk, 97 U.S. 484, 489 (1878); see also
United States v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 338 U.S 366, 375 (1949).
" Dominion, 641 F.3d at 1367
114 id
1s Dominion Res., Inc. v. United States, 641 F.3d 1359, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
"
6 Id. at 1367-68.
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Contract applied only to the immediate rights and duties of the contract
and not a claim for damages." 7
V. COMMENT
The string of lawsuits and counter-lawsuits pertaining to SNF
resulted in decades of delay and failed to produce as solution to the SNF
disposal issue. The decision made by the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit in the instant case provides another victory for the utilities in their
effort to make the government fulfill its promises. However, the decision
fails to offer a long-term solution to the nuclear waste disposal question.
A. The Good News
Dominion illustrates the government's most recent failure to
maneuver out of the thirty-three year old problem that it created. For
decades, both the American public and their elected representatives have
misunderstood nuclear power and nuclear waste. When safely produced
and disposed of, nuclear power can become a valuable component of
clean, local and economic energy production. However, incidents like
Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and Fukushima Dai-ichi" 8 engendered
7 Id. at 1368.
" On March 11, 2011, a 9.0 magnitude earthquake rocked Japan and led to explosions
and radiation release in four units of the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant. See
CHARLES MILLER, ET AL., RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EXCHANGING REACTOR SAFETY IN
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public distrust of nuclear power, while years of safe generation have done
little to assuage fears. Well-founded or not, American anxiety toward
nuclear power generation became evident in the aftermath of the 1979
Three Mile Island incident. A mere four years later, Congress and
President Reagan ignored the delicate political situation and passed the
NWPA into law. The NWPA forced nuclear utilities into Standard
Contracts and promised to collect SNF within fifteen years.
The utilities relied on the government's promise. Ideally, the
utilities would have foreseen the problems with the Standard Contract.
They could have constructed medium- and long-term SNF storage
facilities on their sites. Such a course of action would have been
particularly prudent after the January 31, 1998 deadline passed and the
government was in partial breach of the contract. However, as seen in
Yankee Atomic, the government's obligations to perform survived its
partial breach of the Standard Contract, leaving the utilities with no
obligation to mitigate.
The courts have correctly pinned the duty to perform on the
breaching party: the United States government. The government has
employed a number of arguments in an attempt to avoid liability. Such
efforts in the 1990's led to delay of litigation, until the Department issued
a final ruling or until the January 31, 1998 deadline passed. Since the
decision in Northern II, held utilities need not pursue alternative dispute
resolution but may instead seek judicial remedies, the government's
efforts have consistently led to its defeat in litigation.
In the case at hand, the utilities built yet another bulwark against
the government's efforts to shirk its obligations. In Dominion, the
THE 21ST CENTURY, July 21, 2011, available at
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1118/ML I 1861807.pdf.
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government tried to use a separate legislative act, the Claims Act, to prove
that the NWPA's assignment clause went against public policy. However,
the court saw the broad and precise language of the NWPA as clear
evidence that Congress meant to permit utilities to assign their rights to
SNF storage. The government must honor the obligations it made in the
NWPA, which pertained to the matter in question. Specific legislation and
clear intent trump unspecific and removed statutes.
Not only did the court establish precedent that the government
could not use the Claims Act to dodge its contractual obligations, it also
established precedent which indicates the government would likely fail at
other attempts to use the "against public policy" end-run around the plain
and clear language of the statute. The precedential framework of
Dominion forecloses an array of sources the government could use in
citing from the multitudinous volumes of United States statutes in an
attempt to dart from the terms it agreed to when it foisted the Standard
Contract upon all nuclear utilities.
Additionally, Dominion emerged victorious on the government's
claim that the government needed to use discovery to see if the utility
benefited from not having to pay the one-time fee until the government
performed. After a string of split decisions and outright setbacks, the
government's arsenal of arguments appears empty. In fact, the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit chastised the government for reusing an
unsuccessful argument it first employed in Yankee Atomic.119 Dominion
builds upon the court's decision in Yankee Atomic, in which the court
allowed the utility to recover a one-time fee. Moreover, Dominion
forecloses on another theory of recovery for the government: the
possibility that utilities benefited from not yet having to pay the one-time
1l9 Dominion Resources, Inc. v. United States, 641 F.3d 1359, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(citing Yankee Atomic Elec. Co. v. United States, 536 F.3d 1268, 1280 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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fee. The decision in the instant case prevented the perverse possibility of
the government wronging the utilities and then asking the utilities to
compensate the government for the harm that the government caused.
B. The Bad News
However, the positive gains of the instant case fail to mask the
greater problems of nuclear waste disposal. There remains no long term,
sustainable solution to SNF storage. Though utilities may still assign
claims for damages, the political problems surrounding SNF and the
swelling cost to the taxpayer still remain.
American nuclear power policy remains mired in short term
solutions. The thirty-year struggle over Yucca Mountain illustrates the
political intransigence that surrounds SNF disposal. No long-term
political solution appears likely. Public opposition to SNF storage or
transportation that comes near their property makes Congressional action
on long-term storage difficult. Without any long-term storage facility,
SNF will remain in short term storage at nuclear plants themselves, and
the instant case does nothing to persuade the government to fulfill its
obligations.
Additionally, the government's defeat led to a higher bill for the
taxpayer. Not only must the taxpayer foot the bill for ongoing studies into
a permanent SNF storage facility-the ultimate cost of transporting SNF
across the country and into one depository-she must also pay for the
government's legal bills. Indeed, according to the estimate of the Office
of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, the cost to the taxpayer of the
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government's broken promise exceeds nine billion dollars.120 With no
permanent depository site in the foreseeable future, the taxpayer's bill will
only increase without a solution.
VI. CONCLUSION
Dominion demonstrates utilities' prowess at placing liability on the
government for failing to dispose of SNF. Certainly, the government
deserves it share of the blame for failing to fulfill its part of the bargain.
The utilities need recourse for storing their SNF for a much longer period
than initially anticipated. However, by succeeding in this manner, the
court offers the utilities yet another stopgap solution to an endemic
problem.
The policies of a republic move with public opinion. Though not
without tragedy, nations like France that moved most of their energy
production to nuclear plants have not experienced the realigning terror of a
domestic nuclear disaster like Three Mile Island. Not only did Three Mile
Island put a halt to nuclear plant construction for three decades, it also
made the phrase "nearby nuclear waste storage or transportation" a
radioactive term in the political arena. Fear produced an unstable and
shortsighted policy byproduct. Especially following Chernobyl, the
American public saw SNF as a public evil that should be safely
transported and stored-elsewhere. However, in a nation of over
300,000,000 citizens, it is inevitable that elsewhere for one is another's
nearby.
12o Kenny, supra note 311, at 1331 (citing Matthew L. Wald, US. to Owe Billions for
Delays in Nuclear Dump, Official Says, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 7, 2007, at C4).
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The government allowed itself to become trapped in a prison of its
own making. It overpromised when it guaranteed collection of SNF.
Public opposition to a national depository blocked the government's only
way out of its obligation. Over the past decade, the utilities have used the
courts to reinforce the government's duty. With the help of solid bricks
labeled stare decisis, the government's duty to collect SNF appears
immovable.
However, the turbulent events of the last three years point to an
escape through legislation. The Republican wave in the 2010 midterm
elections hinged in part on an increased opposition to the deficit spending
of the current administration. Austerity reemerged as part of the
acceptable political lexicon of the United Kingdom and nations in the
Eurozone. With Greece and other southern European countries teetering
on the brink of collapse due to years of unsustainable and irresponsible
promises of public spending, American legislators may take another look
at the half-a-billion dollars a year the nation wastes on delays in the
opening of a national nuclear repository.
Additionally, policy makers may see that our failed thirty-four year
attempt to lead by example in nuclear proliferation warrants another
strategy. The Carter Administration abandoned American SNF recycling
in an attempt to demonstrate the country's commitment to non-
proliferation of nuclear weapons, because of the weapons-grade plutonium
byproduct of SNF reprocessing. One could hardly argue that Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad and Ali Khamenei would have already succeeded in
facilitating the production of an operational Iranian nuclear bomb were it
not for the meddlesome moralistic stance the United States takes on SNF
recycling. SNF recycling would solve neither the immediate nor the long-
term SNF storage issues. However, it would help to decrease future SNF
transportation and storage costs while making nuclear power more
efficient and sustainable.
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Dominion Resources v. United States demonstrates that courts will
not provide the government with a way out of its costly SNF storage
predicament. The answer lies with the legislature. Congress created the
mess and, as this decision demonstrates, the courts continue to insist that
Congress clean it up.
MARK D. GODFREY
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